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Abstract
Social media play an increasingly important part in the communication strategies of po-
litical campaigns by reflecting information about the policy preferences and opinions
of political actors and their public followers. In addition, the content of the messages
provides rich information about the political issues and the framing of those issues
during elections, such as whether contested issues concern Europe or rather extend
pre-existing national debates. In this study, we survey the European landscape of so-
cial media using tweets originating from and referring to political actors during the
2014 European Parliament election campaign. We describe the language and national
distribution of the messages, the relative volume of different types of communications,
and the factors that determine the adoption and use of social media by the candidates.
We also analyze the dynamics of the volume and content of the communications over
the duration of the campaign with reference to both the EU integration dimension of
the debate and the prominence of the most visible list-leading candidates. Our findings
indicate that the lead candidates and their televised debate had a prominent influence
on the volume and content of communications, and that the content and emotional
tone of communications more reflects preferences along the EU dimension of political
contestation rather than classic national issues relating to left-right differences.
∗Supported by the "European Election Study 2014" MZES project, and by European Research Council grant
ERC-2011-StG 283794-QUANTESS.
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The complexity of communicating political messages by European parties and national par-
ties distributed across the 28 member states of the EU poses a significant challenge. Con-
sequently, most communication occurs within national and linguistic boundaries. Modern
social media, however, provides a unique technological means to bridge linguistic divides,
as well as to extend the reach of political communications by candidates and parties to the
electorates located in the multi-national political system of the European Union. Despite
this potential, very little is yet known about the role or effects of social media in European
political campaigns. Our study addresses this gap by providing a systematic exploration of
the social media space in Europe-wide politics, by examining election-related content on
Twitter, the micro-blogging platform with more than 316 million active users worldwide.
In 2014, some 18% of MEP candidates had Twitter accounts, but relatively little is known
about why only one in five candidates used this medium, what are the patterns of their
usage, or what patterns can be found in the content of their messages. With respect to
EU citizens, we know even less about how they use Twitter to communicate to or about
European election parties or candidates.
In this paper we map the usage of social media in the 2014 European Parliament (EP)
election focusing on Twitter, including an analysis of the networks of followers, the usage of
national and cross-national hashtags related to the EU, and the types of Twitter communi-
cation. We focus on Twitter because it is the most widely adopted platform by politicians for
the purposes of personal promotion, diffusing policy positions, mobilization and because
it enables a more direct and interactive engagement with the public. Applying sentiment
analysis to the text of the Tweets, we also assess various levels of sentiment associated with
particular concepts or individuals or countries. Finally, by looking at the associations of
message content with external policy measures of candidate parties, we are able to map
content and associations within the text to get a picture of the dialogue across the Euro-
pean issue space of electoral competition. Our approach allows us not only to observe
communication patterns from a structural point of view, but also to investigate the themes
communicated in a period during which political communication is heightened, and to do
so in a multi-national, multi-language context.
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In what follows we first survey existing research on social media and electoral cam-
paigning in Europe and subsequently discuss the European dimension of political contes-
tation which provides the theoretical background from which we derive our expectations
for this exploratory study. After discussing our data collection process and methodology,
we describe tweets and how, present results obtained by social network analysis, sentiment
analysis, and word associations, and offer some concluding remarks along with suggestions
for further research.
1 Social Media and Political Communication
1.1 Social media use in electoral campaigns
Election campaigns fundamentally rely on communication. Over the last decade, changes
in the communication environment due to innovations in digital technologies (Chadwick,
2014; Castells, 2009), which themselves accompanied a process of modernisation and
professionalisation of electoral competition (Lees-Marshment, 2001), have forced political
elites to adopt and integrate in their campaigns increasingly sophisticated digital commu-
nication practices. Faced with a sharp decline in party membership and a more demanding,
assertive and distrustful public increasingly willing to intervene directly in the political pro-
cess (Dalton and Welzel, 2014) (often through the use of digital media-enabled personalised
forms of participation), political parties and candidates embraced new online tools as part
of their campaign communication (Gibson, 2013) Social networking sites like Facebook,
microblogs like Twitter and video-sharing sites like YouTube have not only given politicians
a powerful avenue for interacting with a more demanding citizenry, but also have allowed
them to offer more personalised images to the public and have given less resourceful par-
ties the opportunity to match well-funded campaigns in sophistication, using creative and
relatively inexpensive strategies. Candidates, members of parliament, and local committee
members worldwide are now providing information about their policy positions, invite fol-
lowers to campaign events or meetings on Facebook, and interact with their constituencies
“on the go” and through short messages on Twitter rather than long and time-consuming
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posts on their blogs or websites (Vergeer et al., 2011; Bode and Dalrymple, 2014).
Research has extensively documented the integration of new media tools, and Twitter
specifically, in election campaigns held in numerous European countries (see Strandberg,
2013; Gibson, 2013; Jungherr, 2014a), yet it has yet to acheive the central role that social
media has played in recent US elections. Developments such as what Gibson has termed
“citizen-initiated”-campaigning, aiming to denote the devolving power over core tasks to
the grassroots, is only now slowly emerging in Europe (Gibson, 2013), though with signifi-
cant variation across countries and parties (Hansen and Kosiara-Pederson, 2014; Jungherr,
2014a). Despite lacking in innovation, however, European candidates do use digital media
for other purposes. Facebook and Twitter have allowed candidates to increase their expo-
sure at very little cost (as well as significant risk (Theocharis et al., 2015)), a development
that enabled lesser known candidates to rise from obscurity (Vergeer et al., 2011). So-
cial media has also provided a platform for citizens to communicate directly with political
candidates.
1.2 Social media campaigning in European elections
Research into the integration of social media in European election campaigns is underde-
veloped, due in large part to the phenomenon itself being limited. Even by comparison
with their national political counterparts, European election candidates have been slower
to adopt on-line campaigning tools. For example, Vergeer, Hermans and Cuhna (Vergeer
et al., 2012), in their comparative study of European parties’ and candidates’ use of web-
sites (and therefore of a much less interactive platform than social media) during the 2009
EP elections found significant interactivity divides with many candidates being only mini-
mally active on them. Their study’s insights corroborate findings by Lilleker et al. (2011)
showing that, despite the integration of some more interactive Web 2.0 features into the
2009 European campaign websites, these were used far more for static advertising than for
interactive communication. Lilleker et al. (2011) also found that the integration of “Web
2.0” features on campaign websites by extreme left- and right-wing parties – a topic for
which we continue to know very little, especially with regard to interactive social media
4
– was associated with policy extremism. Right-wing parties offered the greatest opportu-
nities for interaction, while far left parties were at the frontier of information provision
(Lilleker et al., 2011, 206). In the same vein, an overview of the literature on Twitter use
by candidates by Jungherr (2014b) confirms that past research has shown that politicians
that lie on extreme positions in the ideological continuum use Twitter more frequently and
intensively than moderates.
More recent studies have focused exclusively on social media, rather than the integra-
tion of Web 2.0 features on older platforms such as web sites. In a first look at the use
of social media during the 2014 EP elections, Lorenzo-Rodríguez and Madariaga (2015)
found that candidates’ presence on social media is strongly related to incumbency status,
party visibility, position on the ballot, as well as Internet penetration in a given country.
Usage of these platforms seems specifically designed for campaning, rather than general
political communication: once elections are over, there is very little use of Twitter by par-
liamentarians for the purpose of campaigning outside electoral periods Larsson (2015). To
date, no studies have examined the content of social media communications by European
candidates.
With the greatest integration of social media tools in an EP campaign thus far, and with
the vibrant contestation of the EU project at the foreground of the electoral narrative, the
2014 EP elections provides a unique opportunity for mapping EP candidates’ use of Twitter.
Although EP elections traditionally have been dominated by national politics, with Euro-
pean politics playing, at best, a marginal role (Schmitt, 2005; Reif and Schmitt, 1980),the
increased contestation of the European project brought forward the politicisation of Euro-
pean issues. Our main expectation is that the growing importance of the EU topic in EP
elections will be captured by the social media communication centered around the commu-
nication of the MEP candidates.
1.3 Spitzenkandidaten and the EU’s First “Presidential” campaign
A novelty of the 2014 EP election campaign was the system of Spitzenkandidaten, also
known as list-leading candidates. For the first time in the history of EP elections, EP party
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groups had the chance to nominate their candidate for the Presidency of the European Com-
mission. This move was expected both to personalize and politicise the EP elections cam-
paign and also to increase the democratic legitimacy of the Union (Hobolt, 2014; Schmitt
et al., 2015). Consequently, the list leading candidates were expected to play a major role in
the campaign, an expectation which to a large degree they fulfilled. Even if the candidates
had rather limited campaign budgets, their substantial ground presence, the nine televised
debates between them, and their significant social media presence definitely left a mark
(Schmitt et al., 2015). Recent works assessing the impact of the introduction of list-leading
candidates indicates that their presence and campaign efforts improved election turnout
(Schmitt et al., 2015) and raised attention on the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of the
EU (Rohrschneider et al., 2015).
Two of the three major Spitzenkandidat had an active presence on Twitter. S&D’s lead-
ing candidate Martin Schulz had 110,000 Twitter followers and almost 250,000 mentions,
followed by ALDE’s eading candidate Guy Verhofstadt with 26,000 followers and 105,000
mentions, were the most active leading candidates during the campaign. At the same time it
is worth mentionign that the leading candidate of the European People’s Party (EPP) Jean-
Claude Juncker did not set up an official Twitter account. During the May 15 televised
leaders’ debate, broadcast live across the whole of the EU, the "#TELLEUROPE" hashtag was
trending in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands and the UK,
and was mentioned in 110,000 tweets 1. The May 15 leaders’ debate, furthermore, actively
encouraged viewers to pose questions for the leaders via Twitter. As we will see below, the
significant Twitter presence of the Spitzenkandidaten and the Twitter buzz over the May 15
debate had a significant impact of the election discourse over social media.
2 European-level versus national political competition
EP elections are traditionally referred to as “second order” elections because they are thought
to focus on national, rather than European-level issues (van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996;
1Source: http://www3.ebu.ch/contents/news/2014/05/ebu-makes-history-with-the-eurov.
html
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Hix and Marsh, 2007; Schmitt, 2005). In earlier stages of the European project, as most
political parties converged toward an EU-positive position, the EU dimension was far less
salient to domestic and European electoral competition (Hooghe et al., 2002). In this con-
text, previous research found that attitudes towards the EU were at best weak predictors
of electoral behaviour in EP elections (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Hobolt and Wittrock,
2011). But this does not mean that attitudes toward the EU are absent from EP elections.
On the contrary, attitudes towards the EU sum up into an independent European dimension
of political competition that ranges from outright opposition to full support of EU integra-
tion processes (Benoit and Laver, 2012; Gabel and Hix, 2002; McElroy and Benoit, 2007).
The origins of its rise can be identified in the early 1990s when the increasing contestation
of the European project brought an end to the years of “permissive consensus” (Hooghe
and Marks, 2009). In more recent years non-mainstream parties (mainly radical left and
radical right parties) managed to exploit opposition towards the EU by promoting a Eu-
roskeptic stance and polarizing the EU dimension, at the same time increasing its salience
as a political issue (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015; Rovny, 2012). It
is this process that since the 2004 EP elections (at least partly) fuelled the electoral success
of what by now are generally referred to as Euroskeptic parties (De Vries and Edwards,
2009).
The economic and political crisis that preceded the 2014 EP elections and the associated
debates about the future of the Eurozone, the bailout of debtor states, the austerity mea-
sures imposed by the EU, ECB and IMF, and their combined economic consequences, only
further fuelled the rise of EU dimension. Even before the 2014 EP election, debates over
the future of the EU played an important role in the Dutch and Greek legislative elections,
with the positions that parties taking on Europe having decisive effects on their electoral
fortunes.By the 2014 EP elections, debates over how to handle financial crises in the eu-
rozone, migration policies, and other regulations had very effectively roused the “sleeping
giant” of EU politics (van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004) as a political issue.
Here we examine the competing discourses of traditional national left-right issues versus
European issues as they were reflected in social media usage during the campaign. If the
7
dimension of contestation is European, rather than primarily about national issues, then
we would expect to observe three specific patterns, in the usage, patterns, and content of
social media communication.
1. The adoption and usage of social media for campaigning can be be explained by prefer-
ences on European policy, versus national (left-right) policy. This would be evidence
that the elections, and by extension, political communication during the elections is
linked through policy preferences to European issues, rather than simply extending
national politics.
Until the 2014 EP elections, such a common public sphere was missing. What we have
been witnessing is, at best, an increasing “parallelization” of public spheres across Europe,
where similar issues are being debated at the same time (Kriesi and Grande, 2014; Koop-
mans and Statham, 2010), but which do not sum up to an EU wide debate. The spread
of social media has the potential to change this state of affairs. Therefore we would also
expect that:
2. The communication patterns of social media were transnational and European, shar-
ing linkages across many countries, rather than taking place on topics and through
networks that are entirely contained within national contexts. Specifically,
(a) Language barriers notwithstanding, a European level of political discourse as
measured in social media communication implies that there are topics in com-
mon and that citizens are communicating across borders and even languages on
issues of common – and European – interest.
(b) European-wide political communication will be most evident in social media
usage surrounding the list-leading candidates (Spitzenkandidaten), those who
for the first time in 2014 were able to campaign directly as their party groups’
chosen candidates for the presidency of the European Commission.
Finally, using appropriate text analysis tools, we should be able to discern patterns in
the content of social media communications:
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3. The content of social media communications, as measured by the expressions of pro-
and anti-EU statements, and by positive and negative sentiment, is more associated
to patterns of preferences around the EU dimension, than to differences on national
political issues or general left-right policy views.
Taken together, these expectations form specific, testable propositions for better under-
standing how political developments at the European level are reflected in social media and,
importantly, for exploring how these new political communication tools are embedded in
candidates’ political communication strategies in an election with many new and unusual
elements. Before testing for evidence of these patterns, we briefly describe our dataset.
3 Data: Twitter from the 2014 EP Elections
The data used in this paper was collected as part of the European Elections Study 2014,
Social Media Study. We identified and collected the candidate lists of almost all the parties
who competed in the 2014 EP elections.2 We checked which of the identified candidates
had a Twitter and/or a Facebook accounts and linked these to data on all MEP candidates
on record. In total, we found that a total of 3,180 out of 15,353 identified MEP candidates
(21%) had a presence on Twitter.
Using a platform with direct access to the Twitter firehose3, we collected all the social
media communication centred around the candidates4. In the specific case of Twitter, this
implied every tweet, re-tweet and response of a candidate as well as all the responses to
these tweets. We also collected all the tweets that mentioned the candidates in any form.
The data collection procedure lasted for 4 weeks from May 3, 2014 until June 1, 2014,
covering the last 3 weeks of the electoral campaign and the week following the elections.
This produced a database consisting of approximately 3.8 million tweets that we believe
accurately represents the total extent of election-related political communication through
2This process was made easier because elections to the EP are from party lists, and we were able to obtain
the lists of all named candidates.
3This access was provided to our partners at TNS Opinion, through the Vigiglobe platform.
4It needs to be mentioned that 430 accounts were only identified based on subsequent checks made after
the election date. Therefore we were only able to collect the social media communication of 2750 candidate
(i.e 86% of the total number)
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Twitter during 2014 EP elections campaign. In Table 1 summarizes this data and the parties,
candidates, and countries which it covers.
There is considerable variation of candidate Twitter adoption that begins with extremely
low adoption rates, such as in Bulgaria (8%), the Czech Republic (6%), but also Portugal
(7%), to very high, such as in Ireland (73%), Sweden (67%),Finland (67%) and the Nether-
lands (66%). These findings partly confirm previous research on new media adoption and
web campaigning by EU politicians about a “North-South divide” across Europe (Vergeer
et al., 2012) in terms of activity. Divides in Twitter activity are also quite evident on the map
whereby the overall activity appears as much less voluminous in East European countries
and Greece in comparison, for example, to the UK, Italy and the Netherlands. Although
the overall pattern (see Figure 1) pattern is incomplete (due to limited geolocation infor-
mation in tweets), it does seem that in Southern and Eastern European countries fewer EU
politicians own a Twitter account in comparison to their counterparts in Northern European
countries.
Tweets occurred in a total of 34 languages, with Spanish being the top language of all
Tweets (29.9%), followed by Italian (19%), English (17%), and French (13.3%). Among
candidates’ Tweets, English led at 21.2%, followed by Spanish, Italian, and French at 16%,
15%, and 9% respectively. Approximately 1.2% (44,723) of all Tweets were undetectable
from a language standpoint, as they contained only URLs, hashtags, or Twitter user names,
such as “#telleuropeu,u@juncker ♥”. While we do not have precise information
about the national location of every Tweet, we do know what country candidates were
from. Of candidate Tweets using English, only 76% came from the United Kingdom and
Ireland. Another 4.6% of all English Tweets came from Austria, 3.6% from the Nether-
lands, and 2.6% and 2.0% from Germany and Finland. Of the countries using primarily
their own languages, after the English-speaking countries of the UK and Ireland using 96%
English Tweets each, France was the next highest, with 94.7% of its candidates Tweeting
in French, followed by 91.7% of Italian candidates communicating in Italian and 89.5% of
Polish candidates using Polish.
The metadata of tweets from users who have enabled geolocation on their Twitter de-
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Country
Total
Parties
Total
Candi-
dates
Cands
w/Twitter
% Using
Twitter
Total
Tweets
By country
Ireland 7 41 30 73.2 7300
Sweden 12 373 249 66.8 36483
Finland 9 249 166 66.7 16797
Netherlands 10 345 229 66.4 42109
Italy 8 653 355 54.4 70414
Denmark 8 100 54 54 5513
United Kingdom 9 749 341 45.5 66921
Latvia 6 170 64 37.6 4220
Slovenia 10 118 44 37.3 4150
Luxembourg 8 54 19 35.2 14
Cyprus 5 48 15 31.2 587
Estonia 7 88 26 29.5 1115
Austria 7 348 78 22.4 19876
Greece 9 544 118 21.7 7460
Belgium 13 182 38 20.9 2345
Poland 8 1286 249 19.4 13696
Germany 7 946 163 17.2 16772
Lithuania 9 257 33 12.8 507
Spain 9 2105 266 12.6 76784
France 7 3735 411 11 38361
Slovakia 10 334 36 10.8 1193
Croatia 7 275 26 9.5 876
Hungary 6 322 29 9 218
Romania 10 580 48 8.3 411
Bulgaria 7 286 23 8 830
Portugal 5 336 22 6.5 4482
Czech Republic 9 829 48 5.8 1867
TOTAL 222 15353 3180 441301
By incumbency status
Non-incumbent 14,607 2641 18%
Incumbent 746 539 72%
Total 15,353 3180 21%
Table 1: Candidates and Election-Related Twitter Communication during the 2014 EP Elec-
tions, by Country (updating candidates accounts).
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Figure 1: Location of tweets with co-ordinate information enabled, colored by the language
of the tweet.
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vices contain geographical coordinates. Past estimates suggest that the proportion of tweets
containing this volunteered geographic information is around 1-1.5%, and that this propor-
tion is growing(Crampton et al., 2013).5. In our dataset, 1.98% of tweets contained geolo-
cation information. Figure 1 shows the location of these tweets, colored by the detected
language of the tweet. The percentage of tweets that contained geo-location information
varied by language, from around 1.5% (Spanish and French) to 4.7% (Danish). The clear
pattern linking languages to national contexts indicates that social media engagement pri-
marily takes place in the language of the country from which it originates.
4 Explaining Twitter Adoption and Usage By Candidates
4.1 Patterns of Twitter Adoption
Before analyzing the political messages in Twitter content from the 2014 EP elections cam-
paign, it is important to establish in more general terms who tweets. Regarding the personal
characteristics of the candidates, previous research shows that gender and the candidate’s
status strongly predict both whether a candidate has a Twitter account as well as the level
of Twitter usage. Lorenzo-Rodríguez and Madariaga (2015); Vergeer et al. (2011) found
that incumbency status is one of the most important predictors of a candidate’s Twitter
presence. Our analysis confirms this finding (see Tables 1 and 2): Candidates who were
sitting MEPs in 2014 were about four times more likely to have a Twitter account, and six
times more likely if they had also been incumbent in 2009. As we will see below (Figure 5),
furthermore, among the candidates who had a Twitter account, incumbents were also sent
more Tweets per day on average than non-incumbents. A second personal characteristic
that we take into account is gender and, while previous research offers mixed results with
regards to its effects (Jungherr, 2014b), we show here (see results in Table 1 and Model 2)
5Technological, social and behavioural factors mean that the presence or absence of geolocation data
varies cross-nationally and is biased towards urban users, even after accounting for population density (Hecht
and Stephens, 2014)so we do not take it as representative sample. German is not underrepresented in the
geolocation data, suggesting that the relative sparseness of German tweets is a result of less social media
engagement in the elections than in other major European languages.
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Figure 2: Effect of Candidate Party’s Left-right position on the predicted probability of hav-
ing a Twitter Account. Predicted probabilities computed based on Model 5 respectively
Model 4 in Table 2. Predicted values computed while holding all continuous variable at the
mean and all categorical variables at zero.
that male candidates are about 20% more likely to have Twitter accounts6.
We also tested whether the policy positions of a candidate’s party predicted their adop-
tion of Twitter. For measuring policy positions, we linked candidates’ parties to the policy
positions on EU positioning (a 7 point scale) and to general left-right positioning (11 point
scale) from the 2010 Chapel Hill expert survey (Bakker et al., 2012). The results in Table 1
allow for a quadratic link in left-right policy to reflect the influences of extremism on either
side, and a linear link for anti- versus pro-EU preferences. We also added variables that
control for the size of parties (measured as the share of votes that a given party obtained in
the 2014 EP elections) and for the rate of Internet penetration in a give country (this fol-
lows Lorenzo-Rodríguez and Madariaga, 2015). We do this by using a series of multilevel
regression models which take into account the appropriate structure of this additional data
(i.e. candidates nested into parties nested into countries)7.
The results reveal a clear tendency for Twitter adoption to increase with the degree of
pro-Europeanness of a candidate. Specifically, moving one position on the seven point anti-
pro EU scale increases the propensity to find a candidate with Twitter account by between
6In our dataset, we had no data on the candidate gender for 39% of the candidates.
7All models were estimate using the glmer command in the R package lmer. While country level variables
is (i.e. Internet penetration) grand mean centered, for ease of interpretation we chose to present an analysis
in which the party level predictors are not centered. Nevertheless, grand mean centering these predictors
reveals a substantially identical pattern of results.
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Dependent variable: Candidate Has a Twitter Account
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fixed effects
Constant 0.251∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.175, 0.361) (0.234, 0.440) (0.100, 0.318) (0.061, 0.296) (0.070, 0.360)
MEP 2014 7.191∗∗∗ 4.492∗∗∗ 3.432∗∗∗ 3.391∗∗∗ 3.415∗∗∗
(5.847, 8.843) (3.660, 5.512) (2.725, 4.324) (2.693, 4.271) (2.711, 4.300)
MEP 2009 5.713∗∗∗ 4.261∗∗∗ 3.388∗∗∗ 3.430∗∗∗ 3.408∗∗∗
(4.415, 7.392) (3.309, 5.487) (2.540, 4.519) (2.572, 4.572) (2.554, 4.546)
MEP gender 1.201∗∗∗
(1.087, 1.328)
EU position (party) 1.200∗∗∗ 1.148∗∗∗
(1.105, 1.303) (1.044, 1.264)
Left-right (party) 1.791∗∗∗ 1.211
(1.344, 2.388) (0.824, 1.780)
Left-right2 (party) 0.944∗∗∗ 0.981
(0.920, 0.970) (0.946, 1.018)
Party size 2.924 2.996 1.999
(0.729, 11.734) (0.801, 11.201) (0.565, 7.072)
Internet penetration 1.071∗∗∗ 1.062∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗
(country) (1.040, 1.104) (1.031, 1.094) (1.042, 1.114) (1.039, 1.109) (1.041, 1.112)
Random effects (variance)
Intercept (party) 2.012 1.592 2.823
EU position (party) 0.060 0.032
Left-right (party) 0.017 0.015
Party size 8.47 6.331 4.282
Intercept (country) 0.825 0.602 0.733 0.694 0.745
Internet penetration 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Observations (Candidates) 15,361 9,335 6,298 6,298 6,298
Observations (Party) 174 174 174
Observations (Country) 27 27 27 27 27
Log Likelihood −6,145.901 −5,021.652 −3,404.106 −3,404.993 −3,399.572
Akaike Inf. Crit. 12,305.800 10,059.310 6,838.212 6,841.987 6,841.144
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 12,359.280 10,116.440 6,939.432 6,949.955 6,982.852
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2: Predicting MEP Candidates’ Adoption of Twitter. Multilevel logistic regression with
exponentiated coefficients and confidence intervals.
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15 and 20 percent (Models 3 and 5). As depicted in Figure 2, candidates of the most pro-EU
parties are almost twice as likely to have a Twitter account when compared to the candidate
of anti-EU parties, all else being equal. In addition, mainstream party candidates on the
general left-right spectrum were also most likely to adopt Twitter: almost 2.5 times more
likely in the center of the left-right spectrum than at the extremes (right panel of Figure
2). We know from a great deal of previous research, of course, that there is a strong re-
lationship between left-right extremity and anti-EU positions (McElroy and Benoit, 2007).
In Model 5 which includes both, we note that the effect of EU positioning remains statisti-
cally significant while that of left-right positioning does not. When it comes to structuring
the Twitter adoption of European candidates, attitudes towards the EU are more predictive
than that national-level left-right issues, suggesting that our first expectation is confirmed.
A possible explanation why incumbent MEPs are more likely to adopt Twitter is that they
may have the staff or the established party or party group support to set up and maintain
social media accounts. For less mainstream challengers, however, social media offers a
direct route to campaign communication that it far less expensive than more traditional
methods of advertising. With this in mind, the fact that anti-EU parties coming from the
fringes of the ideological spectrum are less likely to take to Twitter is counter-intuitive and
goes against previous expectations (Jungherr, 2014b). A possible explanation, given that
social media maintenance and consultancy is a comparatively resource intensive effort,
is that mainstream parties simply have more resources. Even in the context of the low
salience EP elections, mainstream pro-EU parties have at their disposal a larger pool of
(semi)professional eligible candidates. At the same time even if anti-EU parties have at the
head of the list their well known party leaders (see example of Front National and UKIP),
the bulk of their candidates were (most likely) never before in the position to run for public
office. Thus it is not surprising that such candidates may know little about the benefits
of new media adoption and prefer to channel their few resources towards on more direct
voter outreach, or they simply lack the know-how to create a public profile, which involves
establishing a social media presence. Nevertheless, it is worth examining here whether the
patterns of usage follow the patterns already shown predicting adoption.
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Dependent variable:
Number of Tweets per Candidate
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed effects
Intercept 148.069∗∗∗ 151.308∗∗∗ 173.600∗∗∗
(102.509, 213.877) (104.665, 218.737) (113.200, 266.225)
MEP 2014 1.520∗∗∗ 1.553∗∗∗ 1.553∗∗∗
(1.506, 1.534) (1.539, 1.567) (1.539, 1.568)
MEP gender 0.996 0.996
(0.988, 1.003) (0.988, 1.003)
EU position (candidate) 0.916∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗
(0.911, 0.921) (0.909, 0.919) (0.909, 0.919)
Left-right (candidate) 1.201∗∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗
(1.187, 1.215) (1.182, 1.210) (1.182, 1.210)
Left-right2 (candidate) 0.976∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗
(0.975, 0.977) (0.975, 0.977) (0.975, 0.977)
Party size 0.329
(0.065, 1.666)
Internet penetration 1.019 1.019 1.019
(country) (0.982, 1.059) (0.981, 1.058) (0.981, 1.058)
Random effects (variance)
Intercept (party) 0.591 0.598 0.730
Party size 2.864
Intercept (country) 0.348 0.349 0.350
Internet penetration 0.001 0.001 0.001
Observations (Candidate) 1,349 1,336 1,335
Observations (Party) 124 124 123
Observations (Country) 18 18 18
Log Likelihood −149,773.300 −147,805.100 −147,798.800
Akaike Inf. Crit. 299,566.700 295,632.200 295,625.700
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 299,618.800 295,689.400 295,698.400
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3: Poisson regression of the Number of Tweets per candidate, among candidates with
Twitter accounts. Coefficients and confidence intervals are exponentiated.
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4.2 Patterns of Twitter usage
In Table 3 we predict the volume of Tweets per candidate. We adopt a modeling strategy
similar to the one presented in 3 with the difference that in this case we can use the the pol-
icy position of the candidates calculated from the Twitter follower graph (Barberá, 2015;
Barberá et al., 2015). An interesting and contrary pattern emerges to that shown above
for the probability of having a Twitter account. Among candidates with Twitter accounts,
it turns out that the number of total Tweets sent by users was negatively related to the
level of pro-EU positioning. This patters is clearly illustrated in Figure 3 where we plot the
marginal effects of changes in these two policy variables. Controlling for left-right ideol-
ogy, candidates from anti-EU parties were more active on Twitter, when they had Twitter
accounts, even if the above analysis shows that they were less likely to have such accounts.
While this effect runs opposite to the finding of the relationshiop of EU positioning
to Twitter adoption, it remains in line with our previous expectations, that candidates of
anti-EU parties are a very vocal minority on Twitter. Most anti-EU parties simply lack the
numbers or organizational capacity to organize and support widespread adoption of social
media adoption by their candidates. But for candidates who did embrace such channels,
they tended to use them disproportionately as a cheap and accessible platform to communi-
cate their views and to reach followers. Furthermore, given that anti-EU stances are much
more popular among Twitter users (see Figure 10), pro-EU candidates may have tempered
their expression of pro-EU sentiment or reduced their overall levels of engagement with
the public on Twitter. Previous research has shown that when the mood of the public is
not favorable towards the EU, parties tend to downplay their attachment towards the EU
(Popa and Dumitrescu, 2015). Anti-EU candidates are both more motivated to be active on
Twitter and benefit from a public mood that encourages them to engage with the public by
expressing their policy stances.
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Figure 3: Marginal effects of candidates’ parties’ policy positions on the predicted Tweet
counts, for candidates using Twitter. Predicted probabilities computed based on Model 3
from Table 3.
5 Patterns of Social Media Communication
5.1 Tweet Type and Volume Throughout the Campaign
Twitter activity about the election was relatively constant across the period examined, with
two exceptions: the May 15 leaders’ debate, and the actual elections. Figure 4 shows the
overall volume of tweets sent throughout the campaign by tweet type, first for all tweets
and secondly for candidates’ tweets. Figure 5 complements the picture by showing the
mean tweets per day sent by MEP candidates who had Twitter accounts distinguishing be-
tween incumbents and non-incumbents. The patterns depicted generally confirm previous
findings about the fluctuation in the numbers of Twitter messaging during heated events
such as electoral competition or protests (Jungherr and Jürgens, 2014). In terms of overall
tweeting intensity, the highlight of the campaign period period was the leaders’ TV debate
which was broadcasted live in almost all countries and whose organisers encouraged the
public to tweet about and event address questions to the candidates via the platform.
The picture when looking at the candidates’ tweets is different. The peak in tweet-
ing activity here is reached at the beginning of the election (which with the UK election
being earlier than the others varied somewhat) with incumbents being more active than
non-incumbents throughout the whole campaign confirming findings provided by extant
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Figure 4: Overall Tweet Volume Throughout the Campaign, by Tweet type.
research (Evans et al., 2014; Lorenzo-Rodríguez and Madariaga, 2015). Although no pre-
vious study has asked the question why incumbents are more active than non-incumbents,
we speculate that it is probably a combination of having previously used Twitter successfully
and having established some sort of presence already along with budgetary availability. Un-
surprisingly given previous research (Grant et al., 2010), the highest amount of tweets sent
by candidates are actually retweets, while replies (which obviously denote interactivity) are
consistently fewer. A spike in replies is observed towards the end of the election, presum-
ably because politicians respond to congratulatory messages, and in a matter of a week the
whole Twitter activity effectively dies out. This last is consistent with Larsson (2015) which,
examining the extent to which EP elections candidates use Twitter permanently or mainly
during campaigns, found that their tweeting is not characterised by any permanence, with
most Twitter activities dying out at the end of the election.
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5.2 National versus European Dialogue
5.3 Most popular hashtags
What did the conversation across and within countries look like on Twitter? Was it focused
predominantly on national issues or was there cross country discussion reflecting some-
thing along the lines of a debate on Europe and, if so, who participated in it? We created
a country-by-hashtag matrix and used the social network visualisation software package
Gephi to depict the networked structure of Twitter conversations. Figure 6 plots a network
graph of the debate based on the country-by-hashtag matrix, showing both the connections
between countries (left) and between hashtags (right). As we are interested in depicting
how hashtag-based conversation unfolds within countries as well as across countries, we
use Gephi’s Force Atlas 2 algorithm to generate a network visualisation that is optimal for
network spatialization, and because it allows for a good representation of networks with
different structural densities. After generating the network, we use Gephi’s modularity
statistic which effectively measures how a network decomposes into modular communities
and colours them accordingly.
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Figure 6: Network graphs depicting within and between country hashtag-based Twitter
conversations
In the left panel of Figure 6, revolving around the centre of the network are different
communities representing different countries. In the right panel, we remove the country
names to focus on the most popular hashtags across countries. As can be seen, especially
from the biggest and more voluminous in terms of tweets and hashtags countries, most
countries have a clearly identifiable conversation that is unique to the country itself and
mainly focuses on national issues (evident from the edges that are unique to, and sur-
round, the country-node, and are headed in the opposite direction from the centre of the
network). Table 4 shows the top 10 within-country hashtags in eight countries, along with
their percentages, reflecting the most popular topics of conversation in each one of them.
Seen in combination with Table 5, which displays the top 10 most popular between-country
hashtags along with their indegree value (denoting the number of countries across which
discussion around this particular hashtag is shared), it becomes clear that the there is a
conversation around the EP elections (and Europe in general) among all country lists. This
finding lends some support to the idea that a European dimension does emerge as a topic
of political contestation on Twitter.
The centering of conversation about specific EU-related hashtags is also distinguishable
in the network visualisation in Figure 6 by looking at the edges headed towards hashtags
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located at the centre of the network and shared by many country-nodes. In fact, there is not
a single country of those listed in Table 4 that doesn’t include an EU-related hashtag among
the top 10 most popular hahstags. Interestingly, even though in all countries listed in Table
4 the EP elections are among the most discussed issues, one still needs to note that EU-wide
hashtags about the election generally rank lower than national-specific hashtags about the
election. For example, although the EU-wide hashtags #eu, #telleurope, #europe and #ep
are some of the most popular "connectors" of the debate between different countries (and,
when they appear, are depicted in bold in Table 4), none of them tops the list of the top
within-country hashtags – although Germany appears to be an exception. Yet, this doesn’t
mean that discussion regarding the EP elections is not present or popular at the national
level. Contrary to our expectations, what we rather see is a form of "parallelization" whereby
although similar issues are being debated at the same time in different countries, there is
an absence of a common public sphere (Kriesi and Grande, 2014; Koopmans and Statham,
2010). For example, the hashtags #eurovaalit, #notreeurope, #europawahl, #europa, and
#primaveraeuropa 8, which take up between 3% and 31% of all within-country tweets in
Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Spain respectively, still reflect a discussion around the
EP elections; just not one that is transnational. This is also evident from our previous
analysis of the languages used by candidates, showing that although communication in
English (reflecting a trans-national discussion) is clearly present, most communication is in
fact taking place in the national language. Overall, this runs contrary to our expectation
that social media networking capacities may be able to bridge the debate about the EU,
assisting in the creation of what could be thought of as a public sphere.
As one would expect in an electoral campaign environment, one also needs to note the
presence of hashtags that make references to specific national parties. Among these, some
of the most prominent parties on Twitter are Euroskeptic parties such as UKIP (#UKIP),
Front National (#fn), True Finns (#kokomus) Lega Nord(#lega). This suggests that the so-
cial media debate over the legitimacy of the EU is especially prominent in countries where
anti-EU parties obtain high electoral scores, and thus especially relevant to the UK and
8All these hashtags rank in the top 5 most popular within-country hashtags in their respective countries.
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France, where UKIP and Front National respectively both scored important victories. Over-
all, although it cannot be claimed that the social media communication at the time of EP
elections reflects exclusively an opposition towards the legitimacy of the EU project, despite
the plentiful discussion about the EU and the EP elections, a good chunk of the conversation
is indeed oriented towards contesting the EU. This again speaks to the "parallelization" of
the public sphere rather than to the existence of a common European public sphere.
Observing the graphs along with the in-degree centrality values, we see that, although
each country has its own domestic debate about national (e.g., #ukip #bbcbias, #whyiv-
otedukip in the UK) as well as European issues, there is also transnational debate about
the EP elections in which all countries engage in. This is evident from the most popular
between-country hashtags depicted in Table 5. In all, while especially in the countries with
many Twitter users there is a lot of conversation about Europe and the EP elections visi-
bly taking place at the national level, there is clearly cross-country conversation about this
topic too (although as evident from the most prominent within-country hashtag this con-
versation is far less voluminous). As an indication, the top 10 hashtags of the network are
#eu, #telleurope, #withjuncker, #europe, #ukraine, #bringbackourgirls, #ep, #ttip and
#eurovision, all of whom are at the very centre of the network and receive edges from 24
countries. The very existence of transnational discussion, even if not very important, sends
a hopeful message about the future shaping of a European public sphere.
5.4 Hashtags associated with the Spitzenkandidaten
In the 2014 European elections, the major political groups promoted lead candidates in an
effort to promote visibility for the elections and mobilize turnout (Schmitt et al., 2015). An
important aspect of public engagement with the lead candidates is social media discussion.
We examined the prominence of the three most visible lead candidates — Jean-Claude
Juncker, Martin Schulz, and Guy Verhofstadt — by selecting all tweets which contain the
surnames of these three candidates.9
9Our search criteria based on the lead candidates’ twitter user names meant that false-positive results —
tweets containing the candidate’s surname string that did not actually refer to the lead candidate — were
almost non-existent.
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The word cloud in Figure 7 shows the hashtags associated with mentions of the Lead
Candidates. The colour and position of the hashtag indicates which candidate it co-occurred
with most, and the size of the word is determined by the margin by which it is associated
with that candidate more than the others. Hashtags specifically and explicitly voicing sup-
port for a particular candidate were successful in dominating the discussion associated with
that candidate’s name.
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Figure 8 shows the relative prominence of mentions of the candidates names over the
duration of the campaign. Among these three candidates, Martin Schulz was the most
prominent in the early stages of the campaign. Over the days surrounding the leaders’
debate on May 15th, Verhofstadt received a notable rise in support, which also coincided
with media coverage of the launch of his campaign poster, mirrored in our data with the
hashtag #Verhofstadt poster. Schulz again dominated the discussion in the period leading
to and during the election, but as the election results became clear from May 25, Juncker
rose to prominence in the discussion. As the leader of the EPP, the party which had secured
the most votes, he was identified in media reports as being most likely to become European
Commission president.
6 The Content of Social Media Communication
Our examination of hashtags associated with patterns of social media communication have
already hinted at the content of these communications. In this section we analyze the
content more deeply, examining its relationship to emotional tone and by implication, Euro-
skepticism, and how it is used to convey messages about the candidates’ preferences for EU
versus left-right policy issues.
6.1 Hashtags associated with positioning on the EU Dimension
Many of the top within-national hashtags refer to national parties with Euroskeptic views.
The network centrality measures suggest that Euroskeptic hashtags are not so prominent
cross-nationally. In order to directly discover hashtags that represent a position on EU
integration, we used an “elastic net” regularized regression model (Zou and Hastie, 2005)
to measure the association between hashtag frequency and the EU integration policy of
MEPs, using estimates of policy positions calculated from the Twitter follower graph and
validated against EU positions from the expert judgements (Barberá, 2015; Barberá et al.,
2015). The elastic net regression combines the penalties of LASSO and ridge regression,
so that a limit is imposed on the sum of both the absolute and the squared values of the
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Figure 7: Hashtags co-occurring with names of Lead Candidates. Each hashtag is positioned
and colored by the candidate with which it has the highest relative co-occurrence.
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Between-country hashtag
In-degree
centrality value
#eu 24
#telleurope 24
#withjuncker 24
#europe 21
#ukraine 21
#bringbackourgirls 20
#ep 20
#ttip 19
#eurovision 19
#europeday 19
#ff 18
#russia 18
#euco 18
#pforp 18
#knockthevote 17
#votegreen 16
#nowschulz 16
#selfie 16
#ivoteliberal 16
#lgbt 16
Table 5: Top 20 between-country hashtags
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Figure 8: Proportional occurrence rates of Lead Candidate names and prominent hashtags
over duration of campaign.
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coefficients (the L1 and L2 norms).
We extracted the frequency with which hashtags occurred in the tweets of each candi-
date, for hashtags that were used by at least ten candidates and occurred at least twenty
times in total, and weighted the frequencies by the product of term frequency and inverse
document frequency (tf-idf), considering the tweets of each candidate as a single docu-
ment. We excluded candidates that produced fewer than 200 characters of text in total.
After applying these thresholds, 886 hashtags remained.10
The wordclouds in figure 9 show the 70 most frequent hashtags that had non-zero coef-
ficients in the resulting models, where positive coefficients were associated with a pro-EU
integration position, and negative co-efficients with a Euroskeptic position. The position of
a hashtag in the wordcloud indicates which stance it is more associated with, and the size
of the word indicates the absolute value of the regression coefficient of the hashtag.
In the cross-national hashtags, mention of #serbia is predictive of support for EU inte-
gration, perhaps reflecting an ongoing debate over Serbian accession to the EU in during
2014, as well as news coverage of EU aid provided to Serbia in response to severe floods
on May 19th 2014. The hashtag #Geithner is strongly associated with a negative position
on EU integration — news archives from the campaign period show that a book published
on 12th May 2014 by former US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner heavily criticised EU
leaders’ handling of the financial crisis. In some cases, the same issue is discussed by both
sides of the policy debate, using different hashtags. For example, #migration is associated
with a pro-EU stance, and #immigration with a Euroskeptic position.
10We fit the elastic net model using these hashtags as parameters, and the EU policy position of the candi-
date as the dependent variable. The model fit was evaluated using ten-fold cross-validation, using a mixing
parameter of α = 0.005. The value for the λ parameter, which determines the amount of shrinkage applied
to the coefficients, was 2.34, chosen to minimize the mean-squared error of prediction. For the best cross-
national model, with 490 non-zero coefficients, the variation in EU policy position explained by the hashtags
selected is 73%. We also fit models with lower frequency thresholds for individual countries for which enough
candidate tweet text was available. Perhaps due to a more homogeneous vocabulary, the fit of these models
was better, with the UK, Spain, and Germany hashtags accounting for 83%, 91% and 76% of the deviance
respectively.
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Figure 9: Hashtags associated with EU integration in the United Kingdom and Germany
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Figure 10: Log ratio of pro and anti- EU integration hashtags in tweets from non-candidates
over the duration of the campaign.
6.2 Positive versus negative sentiment
Expert surveys allow us to link policy positions to candidate communications, but in order
to gauge the content of those communications, we need text analytic tools. Here, we adopt
the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) (Pennebaker et al., 2007) psychological dic-
tionary to analyze the emotional tone of tweets originating from candidates. The LIWC
dictionary contain lists of words and word stems linked to a number of psychological cat-
egories developed and refined by Pennebaker et al. (2001), including positive or negative
emotional tone. One of the most widely used language dictionaries in existence, the LIWC
has been applied to investigate political intuitions and ideology (Graham et al., 2009) and
in a variety of social science applications (O‘Connor et al., 2011).
The LIWC is particularly useful in our case as it provides equivalent versions for six
major languages used in Europe: English, Spanish, German, Italian, French, and Dutch.
Applying the dictionaries to the appropriate languages, we aggregated all tweets for each
candidate, and scored their emotional tone as the log ratio of positive to negative emotion,
determined by the sum of the counts of terms in the dictionary category. In Table 6, we
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Dependent variable:
log(positive / negative)
EU Position 0.041∗∗∗
(0.011)
Left-right 0.008
(0.036)
Left-right2 −0.001
(0.004)
English 0.328∗∗∗
(0.047)
French −0.188∗∗∗
(0.052)
German −0.099∗
(0.053)
Italian −1.082∗∗∗
(0.056)
Spanish −0.097∗
(0.055)
Constant 0.385∗∗∗
(0.070)
Observations 4,269
R2 0.205
Adjusted R2 0.203
Residual Std. Error 0.855 (df = 4260)
F Statistic 137.144∗∗∗ (df = 8; 4260)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 6: OLS regression of log ratio of positive to negative emotion as measured by the
LIWC on tweets aggregated by candidate, for English, Spanish, German, Italian, French,
and Dutch. Policy data from Chapel Hill Survey.
regressed this score on the Chapel Hill policy measures of each candidate’s party, as well
as a fixed effect for each language. The results show that while the emotional tone was
unrelated to left-right positioning, it was strongly and positively related to the strength of
preference for pro-European policy stances. For each additional point on the anti- to pro-
EU positioning scale of a candidate’s party, the emotional tone increased by 0.04. We plot
this marginal effect in Figure 11, which shows the clear relationship of EU positioning on
emotional tone: a change of 5 points on this scale (from 2 to 7) is associated with a nearly
50% increase in emotional tone. By contrast, there is no significant association between
the left-right position and the tone, indicating that the content of social media as observed
through Twitter is more related EU issue positioning than classic left-right national issues.
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Figure 11: Marginal effects on emotional tone of EU and general left-right positions of the
candidate’s party. From Table 6.
7 Conclusions
The 2014 EP elections represent one of the first instances in which the electoral competition
across the entire 28 EU members states unfolded in a context in which new media technolo-
gies – especially social networking sites and micro-blogs – have become integral parts of
electoral campaigning and providing avenues for communication between candidates and
citizens. For the first time in the history of EP elections, party groups were able to nominate
a candidate for the Presidency of the European Commission in a move that allowed them
to run more focused and personalised electoral campaigns that would transcend national
borders. Together with the eurozone crisis and the general rise of Euro-scepticism by the
elections, the social media context in 2014 provided a fertile ground for exploring the use
and content of political communications through social media, offering insights into the
ongoing question as to whether European elections are primarily extensions of national
political contests, or rather concern European-level issues.
We examined this question by investigating whether the adoption and usage of Twit-
ter by politicians was linked to party policy positions. We also looked for evidence that
would point to the existence of a European public sphere in which the discussion around
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EP elections transcends national borders. Finally, we examined the content of social media
communications by candidates and followers to evaluate the overall tone of the campaign,
and to see whether variations in this tone can be attributed more to preferences for and
against the EU, versus classic left-right national divisions.
We found that the adoption and use of Twitter by politicians is mostly related to their
position on the anti-pro EU dimension of political competition. While anti-EU party can-
didates were less likely to have Twitter accounts, the anti-EU party candidates who did
have such accounts used them disproportionately relative to more mainstream candidates.
They were much more active on Twitter than the mainstream pro-EU candidates, suggest-
ing that they were using the platform to politicise further the EU dimension by promoting
an anti-EU rhetoric as they have in other communication channels (de Vries and Hobolt,
2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). Furthermore, we found a spike in campaign-related
communications around the leaders’ debate, the only event event outside of the voting it-
self that targeted a truly Europe-wide audience. Communication patterns, however, do not
confirm our expectations about the establishment of a common EU public sphere on Twitter
as, despite signs of a transnationalization of the debate about the EU, parallel discussions
about EU topics unfolding within countries (using local hashtags) are dominant. Content
analysis of the communications also shows us that, among candidates, hashtags associated
with anti-EU stances are at least on par with hashtags reflecting pro-EU stances during the
electoral campaign. Among the public, the anti-EU hashtags do a better job in capturing
the attention of the citizens as they are used more often, although the balance was more
even among candidate content. In explaining the emotional tone of this content in candi-
date communications, negativity was strongly associated with anti-EU policy preferences
instead of left-right positioning. Together, these results demonstrate that political commu-
nication through social media reflects a discourse about European issues and policitizing
the debate over the future and shape of EU institutions and policies, rather than providing
an extension of political competition over traditionally national issues.
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